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Full Version: Akatsuki Venus Climate Orbiter
Unmanned Spaceflight.com > Inner Solar System and the Sun > Venus
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nprev
Aw... sad.gif

P, if it's any comfort, these things do happen. The drama of space exploration is not exaggerated; there are so very many critical things that have to happen for mission success (to say nothing of nominal performance) that it's nothing short of a miracle that they ever happen at all.

Akatsuki caught a bad break.

Although what you're doing right now is certainly not what you expected to be doing, it's arguably of even greater value. You're porting information that otherwise would be exceedingly difficult to obtain in a useable form in English to one of the few guys on the planet--rlorenz--who has world-class expertise on spaceships, and also (apparently) an association with the mission; that's a big deal, that helps, that's a net good thing. wink.gif

Thanks, man.
rlorenz
QUOTE (nprev @ Dec 28 2010, 05:32 AM) *
to one of the few guys on the planet--rlorenz--who has world-class expertise on spaceships, and also (apparently) an association with the mission; that's a big deal, that helps, that's a net good thing. wink.gif


er, no. (blush)
I think any competent spacecraft systems engineer would be able to work this stuff out. I just happen to
have a vested interest in Akatsuki as a NASA Participating Scientist, and have researched (informally, btw) many
spacecraft failures for my book with Dave Harland, so I posted an analysis before anyone else did. I just wish I
could nip up there with a hammer and fix it...

btw I totally endorse your gratitude to Pandanenko for exposing this material to a wider audience.
Paolo
Pandaneko,
I think we are all as grateful as one can be for your translations. Even in the era of machine translation, there is no replacement for the man-in-the-loop for making the whole comprehensible to everyone.
I wish I could be able to make such in-depth analyses as Ralph, but even though I have a degree in aerospace engineering and a specialization in space engineering, it's been 10 years since I last went into these subjects huh.gif
pandaneko
I have given some thought to these FTA pages translation. Rawwise translation scheme is just too complicated.

What I will do from tommorrow on is to go columnwise. With each of 6 columns I will be translating boxes downward, ignoring their vertical positions in the column.

They will be given unique box code names and at that initial stage I will not even explain how each of these boxes are connected.

There is also this branching out issue, between boxes from connecting lines, and these branching out points will be also uniquely coded. I have not yet decided how.

Having translated all these box contents first, I will then indicate connections. That will be a lot easier and perhaps you will not even need to refer to the original Japanese image page, I think, because I will be saying XXX connects to YYY, etc etc. And, these XXX, YYY will be unique, so there will not be mistake made in connection.

Also, if I need to make my own comments with translated boxes in between I will be calling myslf P for short. I hope it will work!

P


pandaneko
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Dec 28 2010, 10:56 PM) *
I have given some thought to these FTA pages translation. Rawwise translation scheme is just too complicated.


2.2 FTA

(Here is my renewed attempt. Each box is now uniquely coded and there will not be mistakes. Each box has been freshly translated. I will later indicate how these boxes are actually connected)

C1B1: (Tree top) Burn stop on detecting attitude anomally

C2B1: prop anomally
C2B2: attitude/orbit control anomally (ACOS)
C2B3: external force due to large meteorite

C3B1: OME anomally at 152 s and torque generated
C3B2: attachment base anomally at 152 s
C3B3: thrust gas direction anomally at 152 s
C3B4: RCS anomally at 152 s
C3B5: liquid flow out at 152 s
C3B6: attitude seonsor anomally at 152 s
C3B7: attitude control harware anomally at 152 s
C3B8: control computing anomally at 152 s

C4B1: thrust gas flow channel deform
C4B2: thrust gas peeling off (??? by P)
C4B3: burn status aanomally (unsymmetrical burn)

C5B1: thruster nozzle throat break
C5B2: burn chamber break
C5B3: nozzle inner surface anomally
C5B4: rear part of throat burn (this box is shaded, i.e., suspect)
C5B5: unstable burn (shaded)
C5B6: injector thrust anomally (shaded)
C5B7: burn chamber inner surface anomally (shaded)

VB1: negative: launch environment stayed within expected values, attitude history telling us not enough force as to cause deform in attachment protion

VB2: negative: we had roughly constant deccerlation just before VOI termination and prop coeeficient estimated from deccerlation corresponds to 1.3. Therefore, there is no possibility of the upstream of throat breakage

VB3: negative: test manouvour was completed normally and there is no other factor affecting this after the test

VB4: possible: cannot exclude this out because burn was made with unkown conditions

VB5: Ditto

VB6: Ditto

VB7: negative: test manouvour was completed normally and there is no other factor affecting this after the test

VB8: negative: RCS functions were normal immediately before and after VOI

VB9: negative: each section's pressure change is in line with delta V, estimated from observed delta V. Therefore, P must have remained unaffected. Outflow impossible.

VB10: negative: threefold redundancy was in place

VB11: negative: hardware is functioning properly at present and telemetry data suggests no fatal anomally

VB12: negative: both before and after the anomally these were functioning as designed

VB13: negative: possibility of collision at this particular moment (152 s) is very small and above all no anomally has been detected with the probe (This one fails me, meteorite collision can happen any time, no?, P)

Anyway, all that remains now is to show how these boxes are connected. My wife is perhaps about give me a shout for dinner, so I send this out right now and upload box connections later on this evening, I think.

Pandaneko
pandaneko
2.2 FTA (Box connection)

1. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B2>>>VB1

2. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B2>C4B1>C5B1> Box A

3. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B3>C4B1>C5B2>>>VB2

4. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B3>C4B2>C5B3>>>VB3

5. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B3>C4B2>C5B4>>>VB4

6. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B3>C4B2>C5B5>>>VB5

7. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B3>C4B3>C5B6>>>VB6

8. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>C3B3>C4B3>C5B7>>>VB7

9. C1B1>C2B1>C3B4>>>VB8

10. C1B1>C2B1>C3B5>>>VB9

11. C1B1>C2B2>C3B6>>>VB10

12. C1B1>C2B2>C3B7>>>VB11

13. C1B1>C2B2>C3B8>>>VB12

14. C1B1>C2B3>>>VB13

Pandaneko
pandaneko
2.2 FTA continues

(Here, we go again. I have been thinking, secretly, that the failure was due to the frozen fuel, because somebody said earlier Nozomi was lost by that. However, this page seems to rule that out. So, that one way mechanical valve, how can such (seemingly simple system) a valve cause this much trouble? P)

(anyway, the first box here, C1B1 comes from Box A on the earlier page, and there are B boxes on this page, but more about B later)

C1B1: thruster nozzle throat break

C2B1: insufficient mechanical strength
C2B2: mechanical strength weakened by excessive external force
C2B3: excessive thermal stress

C3B1: bad design in the first place
C3B2: bad production
C3B3: excessive mechanical environment at launch
C3B4: meteorite collision
C3B5: excessive thermal flow
C3B6: bad film cleaning (I am not too sure about this meaning, P)
C3B7: external heat invasion

C4B1: excessive fuel supply
C4B2: burn conditions shifting to higher temp side
C4B3: insufficient fuel supply
C4B4: film cleaning problem and thrust gas direction anomally (shaded)

C5B1: insufficient fuel supply
C5B2: excessive oxidant supply

C6B1: insufficient pressurising gas (helium?) pressure
C6B2: excessive pressure loss in liquid fuel system
C6B3: fuel leakage from liquid fuel system

C7B1: bad regulation
C7B2: excessive pressure loss in gas system
C7B3: gas leakage from gas system

C8B1: pipe clogging
C8B2: closure of one way mechanical valve (CV-F) (This box is shaded, P)
C8B3: closure of fuel tank outlet

VB1: negative: design test was completed by QT
VB2: negative: AT completed by giving the same stress on the probe that is flying now
VB3: negative: launch environment was all normal
VB4: negative: collision probability calculated and extremely likely that a meteorite larger than expected collided
VB5: negative: observed deccerlation shows that more excessive propulsion than expected did not occur
VB6: negative: P2 (regulated pressure) and P4 (oxidant tank pressure) are regulated by the same regulator valvre and normal

VB7: negative: pre-launch water flow test shows pressurising system was normal and the cleanliness test result after the water flow test was normal. Also, temp measurements indicate that there is no low temp region leading to freezing of fuel vapour

VB8: possible: CV-F valve exists between P2 and P3. If CV-F mulfunctions this may lead to increased pressure loss in the gas system

VB9: negative: due to remaining amount of fuel we cannot imagine that the diaphragm can migrate to the position that may stop fuel supply

VB10: negative: delta V from observed deccerlation (Thank you, NASA!, P) is in line with various pressure changes before and after delta V. Therefore, outflow affecting P3 cannot be imagined

VB11: negative: P3's pressure history shows that there is no possibility of significant pressure loss increase in the liquid system

VB12: negative: delta V from observed deccerlation (Thank you, NASA!, P) is in line with various pressure changes before and after delta V. Therefore, outflow affecting P3 cannot be imagined

VB13: negative: observed deccerlation shows that more excessive propulsion than expected was not produced

VB14: possible: we cannot exclude this out because burn was made in unexpected conditions

VB15: negative: measurement of injector and fuel valve temps shows that there is no abnormal temp factor leading to decreased mechanical strength of the nozzle

Pandaneko

I will upload the box connection for this page tommorow evening, phew...
rlorenz
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Dec 29 2010, 09:19 AM) *
(Here, we go again. I have been thinking, secretly, that the failure was due to the frozen fuel, because somebody said earlier Nozomi was lost by that. However, this page seems to rule that out. So, that one way mechanical valve, how can such (seemingly simple system) a valve cause this much trouble? P)


Very fair question - not immediately obvious, perhaps. One of the key efforts in rocket science (arguably
something that actually is 'rocket science', as opposed to 'aerospace engineering') was to understand
the combustion and heat transfer processes in something that you have to build in such a way that it wont
melt. A lot of the Goddard / Von Braun stuff is all about engine cooling - specifically the arrangement of
the injectors in the combustion chamber. These are arranged such that a thin film of unburnt fuel vapor
acts to isolate the burning fuel/oxidizer and combustion products from the combustion chamber walls, throat
and nozzle and keep them from melting - it is called 'film cooling'. Have a look at a rocket engine in a
museum and you'll likely see all the little holes for this - all quite elaborate.

Now, if the mixture ratio gets messed up by low fuel flow, there may not be enough fuel flow to do this cooling,
and/or the combustion may become uneven. This may lead to a hot spot and thus burnthrough.

Incidentally, it is burnthrough worries that are why Cassini has a main engine cover. The rocket nozzle
has a high-temperature high-emissivity coating which is brittle and could be chipped by a dust impact,
so usually the cover (like the roof on a convertible car) is closed over the engines to prevent that
happening.
monty python
I've always wondered why the cassini people would risk a stuck closed engine cover. The risk for such an impact must have been thought to be well above zero or just compleatly unknown.
pandaneko
QUOTE (rlorenz @ Dec 30 2010, 08:06 AM) *
Very fair question - not immediately obvious, perhaps. One of the key efforts in rocket science (arguably
something that actually is 'rocket science', as opposed to 'aerospace engineering') was to understand
the combustion and heat transfer processes in something that you have to build in such a way that it wont
melt.


Thank you very much, indeed! I truely and sincerely realise that I am being helped by all those colleagues on the forum. I am learning something I could not have possibly learnt by simply translating JAXA reports. Most of my own translations are mistery to me, anyway.

That actually gives me all the more encouragement to dig in and translate files for comments and reading. It is this feeling that I am not alone, wanting to know why Akatsuki failed that is driving me to spend time on my translations. I am most grateful to all of my colleagues. I truely am!

Pandaneko

pandaneko
2.2 FTA continues (box connections)

1. C1B1>C2B2>C3B1>>>VB1

2. C1B1>C2B2>C3B2>>>VB2

3. C1B1>C2B2>C3B3>>>VB3

4. C1B1>C2B2>C3B4>>>VB4

5. C1B1>C2B2>C3B5>C4B1>>>VB5

6. C1B1>C2B3>C3B5>C4B2>C5B1>B>C6B1>C7B1>>>VB6

7. C1B1>C2B3>C3B5>C4B2>C5B1>B>C6B1>C7B2>C8B1>>>VB7

8. C1B1>C2B3>C3B5>C4B2>C5B1>B>C6B1>C7B2>C8B2 (shaded)>>>VB8

9. C1B1>C2B3>C3B5>C4B2>C5B1>B>C6B1>C7B2>C8B3>>>VB9

10. C1B1>C2B3>C3B5>C4B2>C5B1>B>C6B1>C7B3>>>VB10

11. C1B1>C2B2>C3B5>C4B2>C5B1>B>C6B2>>>VB11

12. C1B1>C2B2>C3B5>C4B2>C5B1>B>C6B3>>>VB12

13. C1B1>C2B3>C3B5>C4B2>C5B2>>>VB13

14. C1B1>C2B3>C3B6>C4B4 (saheded)>>>VB14

15. C1B1>C2B3>C3B7>>>VB13

Pandaneko
pandaneko
3. Summary of the first report by Investigation Division

In this report we outlined the scope for failure analysis and measures that may be taken. In particular, we seperated out normal and abnormal data in order to help with future investigations.


We also came up with a couple of likely candidates for the failure through FTA. Next time, we will be reporting on ;

1. More detailed analysis (more detailed FTA)

2. Investigation plan (analysis and testings)

Pandaneko

This is the end of JAXA 17 December 2010 report. I will now move immediately on to JAXA 27 December 2010 report.
pandaneko
Q and A Summary regarding JAXA 17 Dec 2010 report (between SAC members and JAXA)

Contents: Q number, Q title, relevant page number (in this order)

Q1: Design philosophy difference between fuel tank and oxidant tank: page

Q2: OME structure: page 5

Q3: Detailed data from OME test manouvour: page 6

Q4: Justification for the correctness of the pressure sensor output: page 9

Q5: Pressure at OME start and acceralation data: page 10

Q6: about RCS: page 11

Q7: Thermal stress and fuel oversupply: page 13

Q8: Rear throat burn, unstable burn, and injector thrust: page 14

Q9: Stress due to heating and insufficient fuel supply: page 15

Q10: FTA between 0 and 152 seconds: page 16

Q11: Justification for FTA with CV-F one way valve: page 18

Q12: Back (?, P) data upstream of throat: page 19


Q13: About delta V: page 20

Q14: P3 pressure rise after OME burn stop: page 21

Pandaneko

Above is the contents and I will start translating this document from tommorrow on. This is followed by a massive report at 4.4 meg, but since it contains real photos and images actual texts may be small. We will see.
rlorenz
QUOTE (monty python @ Dec 30 2010, 03:19 AM) *
I've always wondered why the cassini people would risk a stuck closed engine cover. The risk for such an impact must have been thought to be well above zero or just compleatly unknown.


Where dust hazard is high, I think Cassini tends to fly through HGA-first

I was amazed at the IEEE Aerospace Conference this year to see a whole talk devoted to the engine cover (quite fascinating)

I believe Cassini ops consider the pros and cons of closing it after each burn (i.e. if another burn is coming up in a
couple of weeks, and we're at apoapsis away from ring particle hazards, leave it open as the (small) risk of sticking
is judged more than the (small) risk of impact). Obviously for long periods, and those close to rings etc, better to close
it. Worst case, the whole thing can be jetissonned by pyro.

(Really worst case, I guess you could blast through it with the engine, though you might get some small thrust
asymmetries)
pandaneko
There is an interesting article in today's Asahi newspaper. I will translate this first, because it is informative to lesser knowleged people like me. This article makes me think... It goes like this:

Akatsuki's failure is now known to have been caused by a mechanical valve mulfunction. Mechanical valve failures have been notorious with space probes. Fundamental solutions require desing alterations and it is feared that Hayabusa 2 might also be affected by this.

These mechanical valves are placed in the piping system which pumps fuel into the combustion chamber. JAXA said that test firing after launch did not show mulfunction, but during the retro firing the valve only opened only 1 to 10% of expected gap. As a result not enough fuel was supplied.

Burn temperature, if perfectly mixed fuel and oxidant is used, will go up to 2000 degrees and the nozzle will start melting. Therefore, typically, more fuel than required is supplied to cause in-efficient burn so that burn tem stays low.

However, with Akatsuki valve mulfunction meant more violent burn. Akatsuki was equipped with a ceramic nozzle, which is 200 degrees more resistant than alloy nozzles at 1500 degrees. However, this limit is thought to have been exceeded after two minutes of burn.

1993 NASA Mars probe had the same problem, the valve not closing and fuel flow reversed and it is thought that the probe exploded in mid space. In view of this JAXA added a second valve in a series. This would decrease the probabilit of reverse flow, but it doubles the probability of valve mulfunction. Nozomi went up in 1998 and the valves mulfunctioned and Nozomi was lost.

Therefore, JAXA went back to one valve system with Akatsuki and conducted extensive ground testing, but still the valve failed yet again.

With HTV that will be going up to ISS in a few weeks' time is equipped with two mechanical valves in a series and tow of this are placed in pararell (4 mechanical valves, that is) because HTV is made to manned specifications. Its computing system is 6 fold redundant.

On the other hand ISAS/JAXA probes are typically at around 0.5 ton, compared with NASA/ESA's tons.

Akatsuki's failure is right now even driving JAXA into re-checking HTV components and even Hayabusa 2's launch may be affected by all this. Substantial design alterations may mean that Hayabusa 2 may not go in 2014.

Pandaneko

I would have thought that larger and heavier probes are easier to make and cheaper...because materials cost must be less of a problem, and lots of space between components meaning easier design, no?

pandaneko
Q1: Design philosophy defference between fuel tank and oxidant tank

Q1 content: Fuel tank side has a diaphgram and the oxidant tank has redundant latching valves. What is the difference between these arrangements? 【

Answer by JAXA: page 9 of investigation 1-2

Answer contents by JAXA:

1. RCS: 1 liquid propulsion system

1.1 We adopted 1 liquid system RCS (attitude control thruster system) because it has been used extensively.

1.2 As a result, RCS does not need oxidant and receives fuel only from fuel system.

1.3 For this reason, our design is such that either one of the two systems will allow 3 axis attitude control and delicate orbital insertion firing. Thus, with each thruster and LV-F they are made into a redundant system.

1.4 With pipings etc, which cannot fail without external forces, no redundancy has been employed.

2. OME: 2 liquid system

2.1 We adopted 2 liquid system for OME (orbit change thruster)

2.2 For that reason, there are 2 supply systems for OME, fuel supply system and oxidant supply system

2.3 We adopted, basically, mono (or uni) system for reasons of resource restriction, use frequency, reliability by trading off.

2.4 With 2 liquid system the wrong mixture of fuel and oxidant will lead to an explosion in the worst case (*), 2 fold redundant system has been adopted to prevent this happening.


2.5 With the fuel tank side, we use a rubber surface to achieve fuel vapour and fuel liquid seperation and prevent fuel reverse flow upstream by a CV-F valve.

2.6 With the oxidant tank side, since there is no rubber surface resistant enough to oxidant we used CV-O and GLV-1 to prevent vapour going upstream.

(*) With Mars Observer, it is thought that it exploded with the wrong mixture just before reaching Mars.

#: It is possible to do liquid and vapour seperation using a metal plate. However, we did not adopt it for Akatsuki because of its low efficiency in extracting out oxidant, and repeated operation is not possible, and therefore, ground testing not possible.

2.7 With the one way mechanical valve, it is true that we did not incorporate redundancy, but all other space agencies adopt the same strategy and it is a generally accepted practice.

As will be shown in 2.2 of this report, we either do not adopt redundancy, or alternatively, we can use a simple series of valves. The only system of pararell and series redundancy (4 valves in all, against both leak and blockage) has been adopted only with HTV in this country which is designed for manned specification.

With GLV-1 and GLV-2, they have benn made into a pararell system to ensure redundancy against blockage.

3. High pressure gas system

3.1 Redundancy has been incorporated both against open/close mulfunctions with regulater valve, latching valve. This policy has been adopted with Hayabusa (1)

Pandaneko

This section has a continuation and I will work on that tommorrow. P
rlorenz
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Dec 31 2010, 07:39 AM) *
2.5 With the fuel tank side, we use a rubber surface to achieve fuel vapour and fuel liquid seperation and prevent fuel reverse flow upstream by a CV-F valve.

2.6 With the oxidant tank side, since there is no rubber surface resistant enough to oxidant we used CV-O and GLV-1 to prevent vapour going upstream.


Very interesting, Pandanenko - thanks again for your hard work on these translations.

Something I do not understand myself is why CV-F is necessary, if its purpose is to prevent
mixing of fuel and oxidizer in the upstream pipework (one theory for the Mars Observer failure -
although only a theory - another holds that the regulator failed..)

In principle the polymer bladder that keeps the fuel at the outlet end shouldnt let any fuel into
the upstream pipework anyway. Is CV-F there to guard against diffusion through the bladder ?

I can see why a valve is necessary if using spin (a la Giotto) to keep propellant at the outlet side
of the tank, or using a shaped metal disk (surface tension propellant management device - which
I think is what the text says JAXA decided not to use on the oxidizer side) but not so much with a
bladder. Tough call, balancing one thing that is not supposed to happen (valve sticking shut, as
here) against another thing that is not supposed to happen (fuel leaking upstream through bladder)...

Maybe some propulsion experts out there can comment on how common practice it is to install
these valves
pandaneko
What follows is the continuation from the earlier section re design philosophy

For information:

Philosophy regarding domestic satellites 2 liquid system mechanical valve redundancy

Single: (single system)

*: same philosophy as with Akatsuki and examples include

Engineering test satellite, type VIII, such as KIku 8 (ETS-VIII)
Lunar satellite, Kaguya (SELENE)
Ultra high speed internet satellite, Kizuna (WINDS)
Mars probe, Nozomi (PLANET-cool.gif
Hayabusa (MUSES-C)
Infrared astronomical satellite, AKARI (ASTRO-F)

Series redundancy:

Reliability against vapour mixing is better, but blockage risk is increased

Examples include:

Communication engineering satellite, Kakehashi (COMETS)
Data relay satellite, Kodama (DRTS)
Multi-purpose transport satellite, Himawari 7 (MTSAS-2)
Quasi something (I cannot find the right translation here, P) satellite, Michibiki
(This satellite is meant to cover GPS hungry areas)

Parerell series redundancy:

This ensures redundancy agaist both vapour mixture and blockage

An example is HTV engineering test vehicle, Kounotori 1, a supply ship for ISS


Pandaneko
pandaneko
Question 2:
Question contents: Show us the OME structure.
JAXA answer: report 1-2 (and I think this refers to their 17 Dec main report)

With this page section I seem to have managed to copy texts as well as the real photo of the engine it took something like 20 seconds to download. My internet line is supposed to be 1 Gbps (best efforts), and it is too risky to upload this file as I obtained it.

you may refer to JAXA original document for this page. Main texts for the engine are:

from left to right, fuel valves ( and I am not sure if these are the mechanical valves we have been looking at, they are pointed at by two forking arrows), injector made of titanium alloy, combustion chamber (ceramic), and nozzle (ceramic)

If the burn temp exceeded 1700 degrees, and it is likely now, not only ceramic parts but also even the injector must have melted, so I think Akatsuki is dead...

Pandaneko

pandaneko
Question 3: Give us the detailed OME test manouvour data, and tell us why part of the data is missing

Relevant protion of the report is page 16 of Investigation 1-2

Answer by JAXA:

Contents of JAXA answer:

1. We will show, in seperate pages to follow, detailed data when OME test burn was conducted.

1.1 Accerlation (8 Hz)
1.2 Angular velocity (8 Hz)
1.3 Attitude angle (8 Hz)
1.4 Propulsion system pressure (1/64 Hz)

For your information: OME test burn outline to follow as follows

1. Test burn of 13 seconds was conducted on 28 June 2010, in order to check on the health of OME, operational procedures, propulsion direction alignment (19:00:00 to 19:00:13 on 28 June 2010, JST)

2. Test burn indicated that we obtained about 12m/s correction from this 13 seconds burn and it confirmed that designed propulsion was obtained.

3. About missing data, we gave priority to 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 data acquisition and as a result we were unable to obtain every 2 seconds data for the following two. This was due to the time available for us. Our original plan was such that data will be obtained during VOI-1 following Usuda DSA visible and then NASA DSN visible

What we could not obtains was:

1. RCS thruster's cumulative burn length during OME burn (every 2 seconds)
2. Temp data with various parts of the propulsion system (every 2 seconds)

Pandaneko

This section is fsupplemented by 4 image pages and I will work on those from tommorrow, then move on to the next question
pandaneko
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Jan 1 2011, 06:42 PM) *
Question 3:

This section is supplemented by 4 image pages and I will work on those from tommorrow, then move on to the next question


PAGE 7: (1) Accelrration histroy (data rate: 8 Hz) (These graphs should be clear enough, P and I will translate main elements on these pages)

Top comment is OME burn duration of 13 seconds, followed by Settling by RCS (from , minus 3 seconds of OME burn), time scale is relative to OME burn start

(2) Angular velocit history (Data rate : 8 Hz)

blue: angular velocity around X-axis
red: Y-axis
green: Z-axis

OME burn duration: 13 seconds, attitude control by RCS, all time relative to OME burn start

PAGE 8: (3) Attitude angle history (data rate: 8 Hz)

blue: around X-axis
red: Y
green: Z

(4) Propulsion system pressure history (data rate: 8 Hz)

OME burn: 13 seconds

red: regulated pressure (P2)
green: fuel tank pressure (P3)
light blue: oxidant tank pressure (P4)
dark blue: (Helium?, P) gas tank pressure (P1)

This is the end of Q3. P

pandaneko
Q4: Title: Justification for pressure sensor output results

Content: Since I think that pressure sensor output results are very important I would like further logical explanations written out, using only the information immediately after the failure for the fuel tank, oxidant tank, and helium tank

Relevant section: Investigation paper 1-2, pages 26 to 27

Answer: by JAXA

Answer content:

We believe that since each data measured during VOI-1 do not show contradictions each sensor was healthy, as will be explained below.

1. P2 and P4

During VOI-1, P2 remained almost constant, and P4 remained constant at 0.02 Mpa than

Immediately after VOI-1, P4 value went up in steps to reach P2 value and thereafter remained constant. These behavoiurs are considered normal and we believe that sensors were healthy.

More detailed information is shown in sec 3.5.6 on Investigation

2. P3

We estimated the fuel tank pressure (P3) variations as follows.

2.1 We calculated instantaneous vacant tank volume space values from the estimated values of the fuel consumption and followed the changes in the value of P3.

Estimated P3 changes were in good correspondence with the telemetry data and explained the pressure decline measued without contradictions. Therefore, we believe that the P3 sensor was healthy.

More detailed information will be given at the next investigation meeting.

2.2 P1

Pressure decline during VOI-1 is in good correspondecnce with the value estimated from P2, P3, and P4 and we believe that P1 sensor was healthy.

More detailed pressure profile is shon in sec 3.5.6 of the Investigation 1-2

P
pandaneko
Q5: Q title: Pressure at the start of OME and acceleration data

Q content: It seems that acceleration went down before tank pressure decline at the start of OME burn. Give me the time series data for pressur and acceleration.

Relevant section: Investigation 1-2, page 26

Answer: JAXA

Answer content:

The following graph shows acceleration and pressure history on OME burn.

A small amount of fuel was used for the settling just before OME burn (3 seconds before)

P3 (fuel tank pressure) is supposed to go down as the settling starts. For your information, P3 data was aquired every 2 seconds (in the Investigation 1-2, sec 3.5.6 it was described as 4 seconds), and acceleration data every 1/8 seconds.

Here below on the same page, there is a graph and I will explain boxes with this graph on the next page, immediately following this.

P
pandaneko
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Jan 2 2011, 06:19 PM) *
Q5: Q title: Pressure at the start of OME and acceleration data

Here below on the same page, there is a graph and I will explain boxes with this graph on the next page, immediately following this.

P


From top to bottm

Box 1: P3 pressure decline with the start of settling

Box 2: acceleration due to the shock of firing start

Box 3: P2, P3, P4 start declining as OME burn starts

Box 4: P3 is not regulated properly

Box 5: OME burn starts

Box 6: Settling (RCS) burn starts

Purple line is the acceleration

P
pandaneko
Q 6: About RCS
Q contents:

1. Show me, on the same time series graph, RCS function history during OME test manouvor and after OME burn start during VOI-1, along with P2, P3 data

2. It is thought that OME's O/F balance is destroyed (or, shifted, P) as P3 goes down when OME and RCS are operational at the same time. Show me the expected value, in this case, of O/F, and also the required specification for this during the development design stage.


Relevant section: Page 27 of Investigation 1-3 (This 1-3 is the second file I translated, with JAXA date of 17 Dec 2010, I also confirm that Inverstigation 1-2 is the first large file I translated, dated 17 Dec, P)

Respondent: JAXA

Answer contents:

1. RCS cumulative burn duration, acceleration, and pressure history during OME burn

1.1 As to the test manouvor this is shown with A/I-22-1-C-1 (I have no idea where this is, P). (RCS cumulative firing duration has not been obtained)

1.2 With VOI-1 relevant data are shown with the next graph (graph 1). (Pressure, cumulative RCS burn: every 2 seconds, acceleration: every 1/8 seconds)

(This question 6 occupies 2 pages, this particular page and the next page which contains another graph, P)

Pandaneko

I am now begining to think that failure details of a single space craft accident have not been made openly available to the general public like this before. This may be turned into a text book for undergraduate students in aerospace engineering..., if properly edited, P

More to follow on this question
pandaneko
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Jan 2 2011, 10:15 PM) *
Q 6: About RCS

1.2 With VOI-1 relevant data are shown with the next graph (graph 1). (Pressure, cumulative RCS burn: every 2 seconds, acceleration: every 1/8 seconds)

(This question 6 occupies 2 pages, this particular page and the next page which contains another graph, P)

More to follow on this question


Explanation on graph 1 here.

Graph 1: RCS cumulative burn length, acceralation, and pressure history during OME burn

(This graph is a bit involved, P)

Left side vertical scale is accerlation (doubled in time) and RCS cumulative burn length, relative to RCS settling timing

The character string on the upper left corner has 3 arrows forking out from it and the character is "Pressure data".

The box up top in the middle has 2 columns.

1. Left column from top to bottom gives: acceralation, AB2, AB4, and fuel tank pressure
2. Right column from top to bottom gives: AB1, AB3, regulated pressure (P2), and oxidant tank pressure (P4)

In the middle of the graph to the right, there is another character strng with 4 arrows. This character reads "RCS cumulative burn period".

Of course, the right hand scale is pressure in mega Pascal, and timings are all relative to OME burn start.

Finally, lower left character string on this graph-1 is "accerlation dobled in time.

Oh, dear, I hoped to copy the remaining text of this page here, but I seem unable to paste it. In fear of loosing all above, I will uploard this as it is and continue with the next page.

P
pandaneko
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Jan 3 2011, 06:03 PM) *
Explanation on graph 1 here.

Oh, dear, I hoped to copy the remaining text of this page here, but I seem unable to paste it. In fear of loosing all above, I will uploard this as it is and continue with the next page.

P


Strictly speaking what follows just bellow was part of the earlier page with graph-1, but it is really about graph-2. Oh, dear, again. I cannot paste it here. PDF does not allow partial copying? What I will do then is to copy the whole of the earlier page and extract out the portion we need. P


pandaneko
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Jan 3 2011, 06:13 PM) *
Strictly speaking what follows just bellow was part of the earlier page with graph-1, but it is really about graph-2. Oh, dear, again. I cannot paste it here. PDF does not allow partial copying? What I will do then is to copy the whole of the earlier page and extract out the portion we need. P


In the end I had to write down my translation by hand on a piece of paper. Here it goes (actually, it is part of graph-2, so it should not have been at the bottom of the earlier page about graph-1, I think).

Graph-2 shows the cumulative RCS burn length, from minus 10 seconds of OME burn up to 375 seconds of the burn.

Here, RCS burn length refers to the total cumulatibe vurn length from the time of launch.

During VOI-1, 3 seconds before OME burn, AB systems thrusters (4 of them) are burnt for 3 seconds, then OME burn starts. During this OME burn RCS is also in burn mode in order to control attitude. RCS is not used after OME burn because we can use reaction wheels.

P
pandaneko
Here goes the explanation on graph-2

Graph-2: RCS cumulative burn length

Scale on left: RCS cumulative length

Character strings on left column on the graph, from top to bottom are:

AB thrusters (1 to 4)
T (1 and 3 ) pair burn
T (2 and 4) pair burn
AT thrusters (1 to 4)

There is a box on the right. Its contents from top to bottom are:

AB1, AB2, AB3, AB4, AT1, AT2, AT3, At4, T1, T2, T3, T4 in this order

Character string on the lower right says:

No thruster burn due to reaction wheels. Control shifted to attitude maintain mode and RCS cumulative burn is not inherited.

Of course, times are all relative to OME burn start. and finally, a very short character string at the very bottom right is: SAFE HOLD MODE"

P
pandaneko
Q 7: About thermal stress and fuel over-supply

Q contents: Re above, tell us more. What do you mean by fuel? Does accerlation increase or decrease if fuel over-supply happens?

Relevant section: Page 5 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:
Answer contents:

1. Fuel is the general term for the mixture of hydrazine; N2H4 and oxidant; MON3 ( 3% NO added to N2O4)

2. Over supply of fuel refers to more of both fuel and oxidant is supplied to OME. As a result, both propulsive power and accerlation by OME is increased

P
pandaneko
Q 8: about rear throat burn, unstable burn, and injector status

Q contents: Are all these above related to insufficient supply of fuel?

Relevant section: pages 4 to 5 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:
Answer contents:

1. We are right now carrying out more detailed FTA on those suspicious candidates reported at the 1st investigation meeting.

2. As a result we think that each of these candidates can be the reason for failure solely due to insufficient fuel supply.

3. We will report on these more detailed FTA result at the next investigation meeting

Q 9: Thermal stresses and insufficient fuel supply

Q contents:

Tell us more about above. Does insufficient fuel supply mean increased burn gas?, or does it mean lower gas temp? Also, does insufficient fuel supply mean increased accerlation, or decrease?

Also, tell us if insufficient push gas pressure (helium?, P) is the same as P3 pressure decrease.

Relevant section: Page 5 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:
Answer contents:

1. With OME, we produce fuel gas by mixing fuel and oxidant. Norminal design mixture rate is over-supply of fuel (O/F ratio is 0.8)

2. It depends on the injector design, but the O/F mixture rate of 1.4 will lead to maximum burn gas temp


3. That is to say that insufficient fuel supply occurs while oxidant supply rate is constant, the mixture ratio shifts away from the norminal ratio of 0.8 and the fuel(burn) gas temp will increase

4. On the other hand, the total fuel supply is decreased as a result propulsive power will decrease

5. Also, P3 pressure indicates the fuel pressure pushed by the pusher gas. Therefore, we described it as P3 decrease.


Q 10: about FTA from 0 to 152 seconds
Q contents: you should consider FTA with the fuel tank pressure decline (0-152 seconds with slowly decreasing probe deccerlation) as the tree top

Relevant section: page 26 of Investigation 1-2


Answer by JAXA:

We will show, on the following page, such a FTA

Here, I stop for tommorrow, leaving the Japanese texts bellow without deleting them, because I think I will have to translate the FTA in question first and this is the first time I have managed to C&P the whole lot of this Q&A file. I do not want loose the rest. I am not good at working with PDF files, to be honest. My assistant used to do all these work for me...

P

page 17
発生事象判定判定根拠VOI-1開始直後からの燃料押しガス燃料タンク圧力P3低下圧力不足ガス系統からのガス漏洩燃料液系統圧損過大加速度から推定される152秒までのOME燃焼状態によると、燃料消費量はむしろ低下しているはず加速度から推定されるスラスタ燃焼状態・供給系状態の推定と、P3を含む各圧力センサ指示値は一致している原因である可能性のある要因RCS触媒温度のテレメトリデータはVOI-1期間中、最高でも400degC以下であり、過大な消費はない×センサポートが閉塞している場合,燃料タンク圧力指示値に変化がないはず推薬残量から,燃料タンク排出口を閉塞する位置にダイヤフラムが移動することはない.VOI-1後, P3はすぐにP2の値まで上昇するはずであるが,実際には1時間程度かかっているため,この事象の可能性は無い.×P3(燃料タンク圧力センサ)ポート閉塞圧力センサ指示値計測異常燃料系圧力低下×××逆止弁CV-Fの閉塞△燃料消費過多燃料液系統からの推薬漏洩調圧不良×同じ調圧弁からガス供給を受けるP2とP4のテレメトリデータは正常.仕様,検査・試験項目をこれまでに確認した範囲では,誤動作の可能性を除外できない.推薬凍結による閉塞×推薬蒸気が燃料タンクのダイヤフラムを透過して加圧系配管に入り込む可能性は否定できないが、温度計測結果から推薬(蒸気)凍結に至る低温状態は無い.ガス系統圧損過大VOI-1開始からの加速度とタンク圧力のテレメトリデータは整合している.打ち上げ前の水流し試験によって加圧系の能力は確認されている.その後の清浄度検査も正常であり,配管の閉塞を引き起こすようなコンタミの可能性は極めて低い.タンク-P3ポート間圧損過大燃料タンク排出口の閉塞VOI-1後、燃料加圧ガス系統に関係する各圧力(P1, P2, P3)は安定している.×配管の閉塞コンタミによる閉塞××RCS側OME側×
18
【質問番号11】CV-Fの逆止弁のFTA判定根拠
【質問内容】
FTAの判定根拠に『テストマヌーバーは正常。以降状態変化する要因がない。』という記述があるが、CV-Fの逆止弁も同じではないのか?テストマヌーバー最終時の冷却段階で変化したと考える余地はないのか。要因を除去するときにテストマヌーバーで正常というのは論理的でないと思われる。
【資料の該当箇所】調査1-3 4ページ
【回答者】JAXA
【回答内容】
テストマヌーバについて
スラスタがVOI-1前最後に作動したのはテストマヌーバであり、軌道情報から速度増分を算出し、そこから算出したスラスタ推力はノミナル値どおりであったので、正常に燃焼したと考えられる。
FTA上で、テストマヌーバを理由に可能性を棄却したのは、以下の2項目である。
・ノズル内面異常
・燃焼室内面異常
この2項目は、スラスタ素材がエロ—ジョンなどにより変化する可能性を想定したものであるが、今回使用しているセラミックスは、その特性上考えられない。
CV-Fについては、テストマヌーバでは使用推薬量が少なかったため、CV-F上下流の差圧が作動圧に達せず、CV-Fは作動していない。したがって、CV-Fの判定にはテストマヌーバは用いていない。
19
【質問番号12】スロートより上流のバックデータ
【質問内容】
スロートより上流(燃焼室)は関係ないというのであれば、そのバックデータを示すこと。
【資料の該当箇所】調査1-3 4ページ
【回答者】JAXA
【回答内容】
152秒で急激に機体加速度が減少した後、152秒から158秒の期間には機体の有意な加速度が観測されている。この加速度低下が、スラスタ燃焼室が破損したことに起因したとすると、燃焼圧が立たないため有効な推力は発生しないと考えられる。とくに156秒から2秒間の加速度を生む推力は302Nであり、これは152秒時の推力の約0.75倍である。この推力低下がスラスタノズル・スロート破損で生じたとすると、推力係数はおよそ1.3となり、この値はノズル開口比1.0のときの値である。
20
【質問番号13】ΔVに関して
【質問内容】
17日の調査部会において、「ΔV前後・・・外部漏洩は考えられない」について質問しましたが、内容をもう一度お教えください。特に、次のことを含めてお教えください。
① 加速度からどのようにしてΔVを求めるのか。
② 圧力P3に影響を及ぼす外部漏洩があると、加速度は大きくなるのか、小さくなるのか。
【資料の該当箇所】調査1-3 4ページ
【回答者】JAXA
【回答内容】
1)加速度のテレメトリデータから、ΔVを求める方法
加速度の時間積分により、ΔV(速度変化量)を算出している。
実際には、機体姿勢角の影響も受けるが、今回の場合には、ほとんどの時間帯で機体姿勢は正常に保たれているため、加速度データの単純な積算だけでΔVの概略値を算出可能である。なお、正確なΔV量については、軌道決定値から算出されるが、今回、機上での加速度計出力による積分と軌道決定結果から算出されたΔV量は1.5%以内の精度で整合している。
2)外部漏洩と加速度の関係
燃料タンク圧力P3の変化を以下のように推定した。
・ある瞬間の燃料タンク空所容積をそれまでの推薬消費量推定値から算定し、P3の変化を逐次推定していった。
・推定したP3変化はP3のテレメトリデータとよく一致しており、機体上で計測されたP3の圧力低下を矛盾無く説明できた。(詳細データについては第2回調査部会でご説明いたします。)
・一方、燃料系統の外部漏洩があると、その分、推薬(燃料・酸化剤)のOMEへの供給量 が減少するため、OMEによる加速度は低下する。
・外部漏洩による反力は、OME燃焼による反力よりも(比推力の意味で)効率が悪いため、 たとえ外部漏洩による反力が推力方向に寄与したとしても、それはOMEによる加速度低 下を完全に補うことはできず、結果として、機体加速度は減少することになる。
・そのため、仮に外部漏洩があると、上記のP3推定値はP3のテレメトリデータと食い違うはずである。
21
【質問番号14】OME噴射終了後のP3圧力の上昇に関して
【質問内容】
資料1-2の27ページにおきまして,OME噴射終了後にP3圧力が上昇し,正常値に戻っている過程を解析し,その内容をお教えください.
【資料の該当箇所】調査1-2 27ページ
【回答者】JAXA
【回答内容】
ご指摘の点については、第2回調査部会資料にてご説明いたします。
pandaneko
According to today's Asahi newspaper here, JAXA is now considering to direct Akatsuki to two asteroids near Venus by changing current orbit, before renewed attempt at re-insertion.

JAXA is conducting detailed orbit calculations for this operation. It is estimated that Akatsuki's propulsive power is down to 70% from its norminal value.

P
Juramike
That would be awesome!
Explorer1
Great news if true!
Can the the cameras handle being re-purposed that broadly? Asteroid flybys seem a rather different photo target compared with orbiting Venus! Much like New Horizons not being allowed to point at Earth, as its too close to the sun to handle.
Presumably they have a solution figured out of they wouldn't bother.
nprev
Not to sound like a wet blanket in any way, but I hope that this 'bonus' strategy (if selected) will leave enough N2H4 for the second Venus orbit insertion attempt as well as manuevering margin for the thrusters.

Still, it's probably a worthwhile gamble, esp. if the second VOI is looking iffy.
ElkGroveDan
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Jan 3 2011, 04:57 AM) *
Does accerlation increase or decrease if fuel over-supply happens?

Its good to know that reporters ask really stupid questions in other parts of the world too.
pandaneko
QUOTE (pandaneko @ Jan 3 2011, 10:38 PM) *
Q 8: about rear throat burn, unstable burn, and injector status

Q contents: Are all these above related to insufficient supply of fuel?

Relevant section: pages 4 to 5 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:
Answer contents:

1. We are right now carrying out more detailed FTA on those suspicious candidates reported at the 1st investigation meeting.

2. As a result we think that each of these candidates can be the reason for failure solely due to insufficient fuel supply.

3. We will report on these more detailed FTA result at the next investigation meeting

Q 9: Thermal stresses and insufficient fuel supply

Q contents:

Tell us more about above. Does insufficient fuel supply mean increased burn gas?, or does it mean lower gas temp? Also, does insufficient fuel supply mean increased accerlation, or decrease?

Also, tell us if insufficient push gas pressure (helium?, P) is the same as P3 pressure decrease.

Relevant section: Page 5 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:
Answer contents:

1. With OME, we produce fuel gas by mixing fuel and oxidant. Norminal design mixture rate is over-supply of fuel (O/F ratio is 0.8)

2. It depends on the injector design, but the O/F mixture rate of 1.4 will lead to maximum burn gas temp


3. That is to say that insufficient fuel supply occurs while oxidant supply rate is constant, the mixture ratio shifts away from the norminal ratio of 0.8 and the fuel(burn) gas temp will increase

4. On the other hand, the total fuel supply is decreased as a result propulsive power will decrease

5. Also, P3 pressure indicates the fuel pressure pushed by the pusher gas. Therefore, we described it as P3 decrease.


Q 10: about FTA from 0 to 152 seconds
Q contents: you should consider FTA with the fuel tank pressure decline (0-152 seconds with slowly decreasing probe deccerlation) as the tree top

Relevant section: page 26 of Investigation 1-2


Answer by JAXA:

We will show below such a FTA

C1B1: fuel tank pressure, P3, decline immediately after VOI-1

C2B1: fuel system pressure decline
C2B2: P3 (fuel tank pressure sensor) port closure
C2B3: pressure sensor valve anomally

C3B1: insufficient gas pressure with fuel push gas
C3B2: fuel liquid system excessive pressure damage
C3B3: fuel leakage from fuel liquid system
C3B4: excessive fuel consumption

C4B1: regulator anomally
C4B2: gas system excessive pressure damage
C4B3: gas leakage from gas system
C4B4: closure of fuel tank outlet
C4B5: tank-P3 port excessive pressure damage
C4B6: OME side
C4B7: RCS side

C5B1: closure of piping system
C5B2: closure of mechanical oneway valve, CV-F (this box is shaded, P)

C6B1: closure by contamination
C6B2: closure by fuel freeze

VB1: negative: P2 and P4 telemetry data are normal and P2 and P4 comes from the same regulator

VB2: negative: pre-launch water flow test confirmed the capacity of the pressurising system. Cleanliness test afterwards was normal. Thus, piping closure by contamination is extremely low

VB3: negative: we cannot rule out the possibility of fuel vapour invading into the pressurising system through the fuel tank diagphram, but telemetry temp data indicates that there was not such a low temperature that can cause fuel vapour freeze

VB4: possible: we checked specs, tests, tested items and we cannot rule out the possibility of mulfunction

VB5: negative: after VOI-1, P1, P2, P3 pressures relating to fuel pressurising gas system are all stable

VB6: negative: given the remaining amount of fuel the diagphram cannot possibly move to a position where fuel tank outlet is closed

VB7: negative: impossible because after VOI-1 P3 was supposed to go up to the value of P2. However, in reality it took some 60 minutes before this happend

VB8: negative: acceralation and tank pressure telemetry data after VOI-1 are in unison

VB9: negative: fuel consumption should have decreased, if any, due to OME burn up to 152 seconds and this is estimated from acceralation data

VB10: negative: RCS catalysis telemetry temp data was 400 degrees at the maximum during VOI-1 and there was no excessive consumption

VB11: negative: if sensor port is closed there should not be any change in the fuel tank pressure value

VB12: negative: app pressure sensor values including P3 are in unison with thruster burn/sypply system status estimated from acceralation data

BOX CONNECTION:

1: C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B1>>>VB1

2. C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B2>C5B1>C6B1>>>VB2

3. C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B2>C5B1>C6B2>>>VB3

4. C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B2>C5B2>>>VB4

5. C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B3>>>VB5

6. C1B1>C2B1>C3B2>C4B4>>>VB6

7. C1B1>C2B1>C3B2>C4B5>>>VB7

8. C1B1>C2B1>C3B3>>>VB8

9. C1B1>C2B1>C3B4>C4B6>>>VB9

10. C1B1>C2B1>C3B4>C4B7>>>VB10

11. C1B1>C2B2>>>VB11

12. C1B1>C2B3>>>VB12

Q 11: foundation for the FTA verdict on the CV-F mechanical valve

Q contents:

There is a statment in the foundation for the FTA that "Test manouvour was normal and there is no element to alter the status".

However, is it true with CV-F? Is there not a room for changes during the cooling stage after the manouvour?

It seems illogical to say that sort of thing when trying to remove offending factors.

Relevant section: page 4 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:

About test manoevour

The very last occasion when the thruster functioned before VOI-1 was during the test manouvour. We calculated the velocity increase from the orbit data and estimated the thruster power and it was within the norminal value. Thus, we concluded that the burn was normal.


FTA rejected the possibility given the test manouvour with the following 2 items.


1. Nozzle inner surface anomally

2. Combustion chamber inner surface anomally

These 2 items relate to the possibility of thruster material anomally due to errosion etc. However, we can rule out that possibility given that ceramic material was used this time.

With CV-F, the amount of fuel used during the test manouvour was small and the differential pressure between downstream and upstream of CV-F did not reach the value that will activate CV-F. Thus, we did not incorporate the test manouvour in our judgement of CV-F.




Q 12:【質問番号12】スロートより上流のバックデータ
【質問内容】
スロートより上流(燃焼室)は関係ないというのであれば、そのバックデータを示すこと。
【資料の該当箇所】調査1-3 4ページ
【回答者】JAXA
【回答内容】
152秒で急激に機体加速度が減少した後、152秒から158秒の期間には機体の有意な加速度が観測されている。この加速度低下が、スラスタ燃焼室が破損したことに起因したとすると、燃焼圧が立たないため有効な推力は発生しないと考えられる。とくに156秒から2秒間の加速度を生む推力は302Nであり、これは152秒時の推力の約0.75倍である。この推力低下がスラスタノズル・スロート破損で生じたとすると、推力係数はおよそ1.3となり、この値はノズル開口比1.0のときの値である。
20
Q 13:【質問番号13】ΔVに関して
【質問内容】
17日の調査部会において、「ΔV前後・・・外部漏洩は考えられない」について質問しましたが、内容をもう一度お教えください。特に、次のことを含めてお教えください。
① 加速度からどのようにしてΔVを求めるのか。
② 圧力P3に影響を及ぼす外部漏洩があると、加速度は大きくなるのか、小さくなるのか。
【資料の該当箇所】調査1-3 4ページ
【回答者】JAXA
【回答内容】
1)加速度のテレメトリデータから、ΔVを求める方法
加速度の時間積分により、ΔV(速度変化量)を算出している。
実際には、機体姿勢角の影響も受けるが、今回の場合には、ほとんどの時間帯で機体姿勢は正常に保たれているため、加速度データの単純な積算だけでΔVの概略値を算出可能である。なお、正確なΔV量については、軌道決定値から算出されるが、今回、機上での加速度計出力による積分と軌道決定結果から算出されたΔV量は1.5%以内の精度で整合している。
2)外部漏洩と加速度の関係
燃料タンク圧力P3の変化を以下のように推定した。
・ある瞬間の燃料タンク空所容積をそれまでの推薬消費量推定値から算定し、P3の変化を逐次推定していった。
・推定したP3変化はP3のテレメトリデータとよく一致しており、機体上で計測されたP3の圧力低下を矛盾無く説明できた。(詳細データについては第2回調査部会でご説明いたします。)
・一方、燃料系統の外部漏洩があると、その分、推薬(燃料・酸化剤)のOMEへの供給量 が減少するため、OMEによる加速度は低下する。
・外部漏洩による反力は、OME燃焼による反力よりも(比推力の意味で)効率が悪いため、 たとえ外部漏洩による反力が推力方向に寄与したとしても、それはOMEによる加速度低 下を完全に補うことはできず、結果として、機体加速度は減少することになる。
・そのため、仮に外部漏洩があると、上記のP3推定値はP3のテレメトリデータと食い違うはずである。
21
Q 14:【質問番号14】OME噴射終了後のP3圧力の上昇に関して
【質問内容】
資料1-2の27ページにおきまして,OME噴射終了後にP3圧力が上昇し,正常値に戻っている過程を解析し,その内容をお教えください.
【資料の該当箇所】調査1-2 27ページ
【回答者】JAXA
【回答内容】
ご指摘の点については、第2回調査部会資料にてご説明いたします。


P
pandaneko
Q 12: Tell us a little more about back (?,P) data upstream of the throat

Q contents: If you say that throat upstream (combustion chamber) is not involved show us the relevant data

Relevant section: page 4 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:

After the rapid decline in decceralation at 152 seconds, we observed significant probe acceralation between 152 seconds and 158 seconds. If breakage of the thruster combustion chamber happened we think that it will not produce burn pressure and therefore this acceralation would not have happened.

In particular, the propulsion for these 2 seconds from 156 seconds was 302N, and this is about 75 % of the propulsion at 152 seconds.

If we assume that this decline in propulsion was due to the thruster nozzle/throat breakage, then propulsion co-efficient is approx. 1.3 and this value is equivalent to that of fully opened nozzle aperture


Q 13: about delta V
Q contents: at the investigation meeting held on 17th December I asked about "at around delta V......leakage (external outflow is impossible", but give us the contents again, in particular, tell us;

1. How you calculate delta V from acceralation?
2. Will the acceralation increase or decrease if external outflow effecting pressure P3?

Relevant section: page 4 of Investigation 1-3

Answer by JAXA:

1. How to obtain delta V from acceralation telemetry data

We carry out integral culculous on the acceralation. In reality it is affected also by the probe attitude, but for most of the time we are looking at the attitude is maintained stable and thus it is possible to do this simplified estimate. For the most accurate determination we must use orbital information (NASA DSN, I think, P).

However, our simplified estimate and that from orbital information are in unison within 1.5% accuracy.

2. Relation between external outflow and acceralation

We did following estimations re fuel tank pressure P3 variation

2.1 We calculated the fuel tank empty volume at each instant based on the estimated fuel consumption until that moment and followed P3 variation based on that.

2.2 Estimated P3 variation was in good unison with the P3 telemetry data and explained the measured P3 decline without contradiction. (We will give you more detailed data at the next investigation meeting)

2.3 On the other hand, there is an external outflow with the fuel system, that leads to decline in the supply to OME (fuel and oxidant) by the same amount and this will lead to a decline in acceralation during OME.

2.4 Reaction force produced by the external outflow is so much more inefficient (with respect to relative propulsive power) compared with that by OME burn. Therefore, as a result, even if reaction force by the external outflow contributed in the same direction as the propulsive direction it will not argument the decline in acceralation by OME burn, and as a result the probe acceralation will have to decline.

2.5 Therefore, if there was an external outflow above estimated P3 value will be contradictory to that from the telemetry data.

Q 14: about P3 pressure increase after OME burn
Q contents: With respect to page 27 of Investigation 1-2 (the first large file I translated, P) tell us more about how P3 value increased after OME burn and then returned to normal

Relevant section: page 27 of Investigation 1-2

Answer by JAXA: We will be reporting on this at the next investigation meeting

(This is the end of the Q&A file dated 27 Dec, P)

By the way, there was an article a few days ago (I tried to find it again, but failed). It said that what JAXA (that is ISAS, in reality) wants to next is to go to Jupitor. However, they cannot do that because they do not have nuclear powered batteries.

Their plan then is to use ion engines (Hayabusa) and a large area solar pannell (IKAROS). It will be years before this happen, of course.

Pandaneko
pandaneko
Oh, my God! I had a quick look at the main JAXA file dated 27 Dec 2010.

It is so much more detailed than Investigation 1-2, with lots of FTAs, and contentswise this report is 70% about the failed CV-F, why they were required, structure, imagined mulfunction graphics etc etc.

I am quite prepared to translate this file (it will take a while, of course), but I am now more worried about the possibility of being chucked out by the admin for using up so much of the forum resources...

Pandaneko
djellison
Don't worry - keep going. Text uses almost no forum resources at all.
tedstryk
Thanks so much for the updates. To me, the asteroid flybys seem like a great idea, perhaps capped by a Venus flyby, given that it seems really doubtful that Akatsuki can go into orbit.
tasp
Are all the computer savvy UMSFers running to their Celestia programs and looking for targets now?

smile.gif


I love asteroid flybys! Are any of the candidates binary? LOL, I am already hoping for a two-fer!
pandaneko
Investigation 2-2

About Akatsuki failure: trying to find causes and measures to be taken

JAXA
ISAS

27 December 2010

P
pandaneko
Page 2: Contents

0: summary of the report at the second investigation meeting

1. More detailed FTA

1.1 System FTA
1.2 Film screening burn (or thrust) direction anomally
1.3 Throat rear burn FTA
1.4 Unstable burn FTA
1.5 Injector thrust direction anomally FTA
1.6 FTA summary

2. Investigating the causes for CV-F closure

2.1 Outline of CV-F
2.2 History of propulsion system in orbit
2.3 CV-F environment in orbit
2.4 Estimating the amount of closure of CV-F
2.5 Estimating the causes for CV-F closure
2.6 Summary of the estimated causes for CV-F closure

3. Scenario from CV-F closure leading up to OME burn stop

3.1 Looking at the tank pressure profile
3.2 Estimating the fuel supply amount during VOI-1 burn
3.3 Looking at the acceralation profile
3.4 OME function history during VOI-1 burn
3.5 Burn status deviated from the designed conditions (imaginary pictures)
3.6 Estimating the externally induced torque during VOI-1 burn
3.7 About the values used to find probe attitude anomally
3.8 Estimated scenario from CV-F closure leading up to burn stop

4. Investigation plan for finding out what happened with CV-F

4.1 Trying to find out the causes of CV-F closure
4.2 Evaluating the effects that CV-F mulfanction brought to OME
4.3 Investigation schedule from now on

5. Summary of the report at the second investigation meeting

Appendices:

A1: Probe outline
A2: Piping system outline
A3: FTA give at the first Investigation meeting (modified)


Pandaneko



pandaneko
Page 3: 0. Summary of the report at the second investigation meeting

We reported on the following contents at the first investigation meeting

Report contents at the first investigation meeting:

1. Summary of the second investigation report
2. Akatsuki's status
3. Orbit insertion plan outline and what happened
4. Report on the data obtained so far
5. FTA
6. At the second investigation meeting we will report on detailed breakdown of the FTAs given at the first investigation meeting. Also, we reported that we have made plans for ground testings etc.

Contents of the report at the second investigation meeting

1. Breakdown of FTA
2. Investigation of the causes for CV-F closure estimated from detailed breakdown
3. Investigation of the causes for CV-F closure estimated from detailed breakdown
4. Estimated scenario in the failure of insertion due to CV-F closure
5. Plans for further investigation of CV-F failure

Pandaneko
pandaneko
For my own sake, really, I looked up at the glossary file, which is easy to understand. These are in English. This file is the third document which Paolo pointed us to.

Anyway,

CV-F: check valve (fuel)
CV-O: check valbe (oxidizer)
OME: Orbit Maneuver Insertion
VOI: Venus Orbital Insertion
TCS: Reaction control system

P
pandaneko
Ambush operation by Akatsuki


What follows appeared in today's Mainichi newspaper (5 January 2011). I am not exactly sure how this new propsal relates to the earlier proposal of directing Akatsuki to two asteroids. Perhaps, these are all combined?

It is now known that JAXA is planning Venus orbit insertion one year earlier than 6 years. By slowing down Akatsuki slowly they think that Venus will catch up with Akatsuki in December 5 years from now. It is thought that it may be possible even with less propulsive Akatsuki space probe. In a way, it is an ambush operation compared with the initial Akatsuki catching up with Venus.

Given Akatsuki's engine power, down to 60% from norminal value, possibility of nozzle break, and CV-F mulfunction it is thought that perfect ressurection of the probe will not be possible. Earlier attempt at insertion will also decrease the possibility of instrument failures due to solar radiation.

JAXA say that tperhaps they will not be able to do the insertion with the initially planned velocity and that they will look at all possible measures in order to observe Venus.

Pandaneko
IM4
QUOTE (tasp @ Jan 4 2011, 06:36 PM) *
Are all the computer savvy UMSFers running to their Celestia programs and looking for targets now?
I love asteroid flybys! Are any of the candidates binary? LOL, I am already hoping for a two-fer!


I am afraid you are too much optimistic about Akatsuki asteroid flybys. Simple estimate gives just 28 relatively large (>0 .1 km) bodies with perihelions being inside Venusian orbit:

CODE
object fullname     diameter(km) q (AU)  a (AU)     e       i (deg)      
1566 Icarus (1949 MA)    1.0    0.187    1.078    0.8268    22.83
1862 Apollo (1932 HA)    1.5    0.647    1.47     0.5599    6.35
1864 Daedalus (1971 FA)  3.7    0.563    1.461    0.6147    22.20
1865 Cerberus (1971 UA)  1.2    0.576    1.08     0.4670    16.09
1981 Midas (1973 EA)     3.4    0.622    1.776    0.6499    39.84
2100 Ra-Shalom (1978 RA) 2.3    0.469    0.8321   0.4365    15.76
2101 Adonis (1936 CA)    0.6    0.442    1.875    0.7640    1.33
2201 Oljato (1947 XC)    1.80   0.623    2.176    0.7136    2.51
2212 Hephaistos(1978 SB) 5.7    0.360    2.167    0.8338    11.74
2340 Hathor (1976 UA)    0.3    0.465    0.8442   0.4497    5.85
3200 Phaethon (1983 TB)  5.10   0.140    1.271    0.8899    22.19
3360 Syrinx (1981 VA)    1.8    0.633    2.468    0.7436    21.41
3362 Khufu (1984 QA)     0.7    0.526    0.9894   0.4686    9.92
3554 Amun (1986 EB)      2.48   0.701    0.9738   0.2805    23.36
4034 (1986 PA)           0.42   0.589    1.06     0.4439    11.17
4197 (1982 TA)           1.8    0.525    2.298    0.7714    12.57
4769 Castalia (1989 PB)  1.4    0.550    1.063    0.4831    8.89
5604 (1992 FE)           0.55   0.551    0.9269   0.4053    4.79
6063 Jason (1984 KB)     1.4    0.518    2.213    0.7662    4.92
66391 (1999 KW4)         1.317  0.200    0.6423   0.6884    38.88
85182 (1991 AQ)          1.1    0.487    2.214    0.7801    3.19
85953 (1999 FK21)        0.59   0.219    0.7388   0.7032    12.60
86039 (1999 NC43)        2.22   0.741    1.759    0.5790    7.12
99907 (1989 VA)          1.4    0.295    0.7285   0.5947    28.80
99942 Apophis (2004MN4)  0.270  0.746    0.9223   0.1911    3.33
(2000 PG3)               4.2    0.408    2.825    0.8554    21.96
2P/Encke                 4.8    0.336    2.214    0.8483    11.78
45P/Honda-Mrkos-Pajdusak 1.6    0.530    3.023    0.8246    4.25


It's hard to predict good target for flyby unless we haven't updated trajectory for spacecraft. Yet some of these bodies have close approaches to Venus in 2010-2016 and possibly to Akatsuki, assuming she will be drifting somewhere around the planet all the time. Anyway there are not too many targets to chose from and none of them looks especially interesting for dedicated flyby. They are too small to be investigated.
pandaneko
Page 4: 1. More detailed FTA

1.1 System FTA

In the following diagram we summarise what we picked up as suspicious elements at the first investigation meeting. We will continue with more detailed FTAs with pages from next on.

Box contents are as follows.

C1B1: (Tree top) burn stop on detecting attitude anomally

C2B1: prop system anomally
C2B2: burn gas channell deformation
C2B3: peeling off of burn gas
C2B4: burn status anomally (unsymmetrical burn)

C3B1: irregular OME torque generation at 152 s
C3B2: thruster nozzle/throat break
C3B3: (shaded) throat rear burn (refer to sec 3.5)
C3B4: (shaded) unstable burn (refer to sec 3.5)
C3B5: (shaded) injector thrust anomally (refer to sec 3.5)

C4B1: burn gas thrust direction anomally at 152 s
C4B2: excessive thermal stress

(Here, I have some difficulties as the boxes below C4B2 are actually verdict boxes, continuing from C3B3, C3B4, and C3B5. Therefore, I decided to call them smile.gif

C4VB1: possible: we cannot rule this out because burn was made under unexperienced conditions
C4VB2: Ditto
C4VB3: Ditto

C5B1: excessive thermal flow (character string just above this box says: Note: D1)
C5B2: bad film cooling

C6B1: burn conditions shifting to higher temp side (mixture ratio increasing)
C6B2: insufficient fuel supply (see sec 3.5)
C6B3: (shaded) film cooling thrust direction anomally
C6B4: box D3
C6B5: box D4
C6B6: box D5

C7B1: insufficient fuel supply

(Here again, below this box C6B3 leads immediately to a verdict box, which I may call:
C7VB1: possible: we cannot rule this out because burn was made under unexperienced conditions

C8B1: insufficient fuel pusher gas pressure

C9B1: excessive pressure damage to gas system
C9B2: box D2

(Here, you will see a yellow arrowpointing at the connection between C8B1 and C9B1. Comment for this arrow says (actually at the bottom of this FTA)
: this is where we reflected on the fuel tank pressure, P3, with this particular FTA

C10B1: (shaded) closure of CV-F

C11VB1: possible: we cannot rule out the possibility of mulfunction given specs, testing and tested items

(Now, here, we find a step like large box enclosed by dotted lines. It contains boxes D2, D3, D4, and D5. The character string right in the middle of this box says: Area where we are going to give more detailed analysis at the second investigation meeting.

D1 to D5 are reference numbers we gave so that they can be related to other FTAs and investigation plans to follow, P)

Box connection:

1. C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B1>C2B2>C3B2>C4B2>C5B1>C6B1>C7B1>C8B1>C9B1>C10B1>>> C11VB1

2. C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B1>C2B2>C3B2>C4B2>C5B2>C6B2>C8B1>C9B1>C10B1>>> C11VB1

3. C1B1>C2B1>C3B1>C4B1>C2B2>C3B2>C4B2>C5B2>C6B3>>> C7VB1>D2

4. C1B1>C2B3>C3B3>>>C4VB1> D3

5. C1B1>C2B4>C3B4>>> C4VB2> D4

6. C1B1>C2B4>C3B5>>> C1VB3> D5

Pandaneko

pandaneko
OK, Akatsuki is almost dead now. However, is there not a possibility that Akatsuki might still go into a more eccentric orbit than planned, perhaps allowing a few times more fly-bys before instruments break down?

Pandaneko
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